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Abstract. Tax policy must address three fundamental 
questions: what is taxed, who is taxed, and how tax 
burdens are allocated among taxpayers. This chapter 
examines the ethical dimensions of these questions, 
including the merits of income taxation, consumption 
taxation and Pigouvian taxes, the tax treatment of families 
and of corporations, the justification of progressive 
taxation, and tax competition. It considers theories of tax 
fairness grounded in taxpayers’ ability to pay and in the 
benefits taxpayers receive from government as well as the 
perspectives of utilitarians, egalitarians, and public choice 
theorists. 
 
 
Nobody likes paying taxes, but almost everybody prefers to live in a 
society with taxation than in one without. Agreement about tax policy 
usually goes no further. This is not surprising since tax policy implicates 
fundamental and hotly contested questions of distributive justice. Given 
that developed nations typically collect at least a quarter of their GDP in 
taxes, the stakes are very high (OECD, 2016). Moreover, taxation is 
used for such a wide range of purposes that almost every area of public 
policy has at least some connection with taxation. Tax policy raises 
extremely complex ethical questions, including both large-scale 
questions of distributive justice, such as the extent to which the tax 
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system should be used to redistribute income, and narrower questions, 
such as how tax rates should be set for different types of households. 
This chapter provides an overview of some of the many debates in tax 
policy that have significant ethical dimensions, with a particular accent 
on the relationship between taxation and democratic government. It 
begins by outlining the function of taxation and the ways in which it 
interacts with ethical concerns. The bulk of the chapter  is devoted to 
ethical questions raised by tax policy, including what should be taxed, 
how we should individuate taxpayers, and how we should allocate tax 
obligations between taxpayers. It examines theories of tax fairness based 
on ability to pay and on the benefits received from government 
spending. The latter part of the chapter discusses the tax base, the 
taxation of families, and the taxation of multinational corporations and 
concludes by exploring a few of the implications of this analysis for 
taxation in democratic theory. 
I. The purpose of taxation 
Taxation is the life blood of the modern fiscal system. The most basic 
function of taxation is to provide revenue for the state. The decision to 
devote a given fraction of income to tax puts the choice of how to use it 
in the hands of the government rather than private parties. In a 
democratic society, this means making consumption choices 
collectively, usually through elected representatives. Tax rates therefore 
establish the balance between private and public choices regarding 
consumption. Less obviously, tax policy may be used to influence 
choices about consumption and investment made by the private sector 
by making some options more expensive than others. Second, taxation is 
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often used to pursue distributive aims. This is most obviously true of 
inheritance taxes, progressive tax rates, and the exemption of necessities 
from consumption taxes. A third important function of taxation is as a 
form of regulation that encourages or discourages certain activities. 
Taxes on pollution, for example, can force polluters to pay the social 
cost of their activities without outright prohibition. Taxation is thus a 
potential alternative to prescriptive regulation that allows the state to 
influence rather than prescribe individual choices. 
Although the substance of tax policy is a source of perennial conflict, 
taxation itself is an important form of social cooperation. Any group of 
people that cannot muster resources for collective projects will not be 
able to act efficaciously as a group and any state that cannot successfully 
raise revenue will not long survive. Taxation might be viewed as a stress 
test for state efficacy. A state unable to collect taxes is probably feeble 
regardless of its formal powers, and a state that does not need to levy 
taxes (e.g., one that receives a great deal of money from state-owned 
natural resources) is in danger of atrophy since its rulers have less need 
to be concerned with the quality of public administration. 
Tax collection is extremely expensive without some degree of willing 
cooperation between government officials and citizens. In pre-modern 
times, collection of direct taxes on income or wealth was 
administratively challenging and states often made do with other forms 
of public finance, such as feudal dues, tariffs, or state monopolies. States 
in the developed world now collect what is, from a historical 
perspective, a remarkable amount of revenue remarkably harmoniously. 
Public cooperation with the tax authorities, sometimes called “tax 
morale”, depends in part on public perceptions of the legitimacy of the 
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state and the fairness of the tax system (Kirchler 2007). Tax morale also 
depends on expectations about the behaviour of others. People often are 
willing to make sacrifices for the public good only if they think others 
will as well (Bicchieri 2006). High tax morale can thus lead to a virtuous 
cycle of high tax collection and high tax compliance, whereas low tax 
morale may lead to a vicious cycle in which most people attempt to 
evade taxes when possible, anticipating that most of their fellow citizens 
do the same. The importance of tax morale is a reason to avoid policies 
that are opaque or diverge too greatly from common moral intuitions 
even if they are desirable on other grounds. It is also a potential source 
of advantage for democratic government since citizens may be more 
likely to cooperate with tax authorities if they feel that they have 
influence over fiscal policy (Casal et al. 2016). 
II. The allocation of tax burdens 
Any system of taxation must address three questions: what is taxed, 
who is a taxpayer, and how tax burdens are allocated among taxpayers. 
The third of these questions raises the most fundamental normative 
questions. Traditional approaches to tax fairness include ‘ability to pay’ 
theories that apportion tax burdens on the basis of taxpayers’ resources 
and ‘benefits’ theories that apportion taxes in proportion to benefits 
received from the state. Whereas ability-to-pay principles consider 
taxation apart from the rest of fiscal policy, benefits theories explicitly 
link taxes with spending by considering the fairness of tax burdens in 
light of the benefits received by the taxpayer from the state. As ability-
to-pay theories are somewhat more straightforward, it makes sense to 
consider them first. 
  5 
II.A ‘Ability to pay’ theories of tax fairness 
‘Ability to pay’ theories evaluate the fairness of tax burdens in light of 
a taxpayer’s income, wealth, or some other measure of ability to bear tax 
burdens. The underlying idea is that fair tax schemes allocate burdens 
between taxpayers impartially. John Stuart Mill (1848: 348) argued that 
‘equality of taxation . . . means equality of sacrifice’, which means that 
every taxpayer should feel ‘no more and no less inconvenience from his 
payments than every other person experiences from his’. It is quite 
difficult to specify what constitutes equality of sacrifice. Ability-to-pay 
theories therefore encompass a wide range of possibilities, including 
proportional taxation schemes in which all taxpayers pay the same tax 
rate for every increment of income and progressive schemes in which 
the marginal tax rate is higher for those with more income or wealth. 
Proponents of both views might agree on a more basic principle, 
horizontal equity. This is the principle that taxpayers with equal incomes 
should pay equal amounts of income tax (Musgrave 1959). Although 
horizontal equity sounds straightforward, applying it proves to be 
difficult. Much seems to depend on how income is defined. Two 
taxpayers might have equal incomes under one definition and quite 
different incomes under another. Although economic analysis might put 
some constraints on plausible definitions of income, there are numerous 
cases in which it is unclear whether a given item reflects true ability to 
pay. Many deductions from taxable income might seem fair on the 
grounds that they capture something important about the taxpayer’s 
ability to pay, regardless of whether the deduction tracks income in a 
purely economic sense. For example, allowing taxpayers to deduct 
health care expenses might seem fair in that money spent on health care 
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reduces disposable income without putting the taxpayer in a better 
position than healthy taxpayers with equivalent income. Horizontal 
equity might therefore be thought to merely shift the question of what 
taxes are fair to the question of what should count as taxable income. 
Even if horizontal equity is responsive to the requirement that the state 
treat citizens as equals, there are such a large number of candidates for 
what might constitute equal treatment that it is difficult to see how one 
can be selected without resort to some further theory of distributive 
justice. 
This problem also infects the debate between proponents of 
proportionate and progressive income taxation, with each appealing to 
different conceptions of equality. The notion that taxes should be 
proportionate to income can be traced back at least to Adam Smith 
(1776). John Stuart Mill defended this principle as best approximating 
‘equal sacrifice’ from every taxpayer (Mill 1848: 350-56). The grounds 
of the view are, however, a bit mysterious on closer inspection (Fried 
1999). It is not clear that a rich person who pays £100,000 in tax on a 
£1,000,000 annual income is making an equal sacrifice to that of a poor 
person who pays £1,000 out of a £10,000 annual income. The former 
may go about life no differently as a result of the tax and merely be left 
with a smaller bank account at the end of the year, whereas £1,000 may 
make a sizable difference to the quality of life of a poor person. Extreme 
results of this sort can be mitigated by exempting income sufficient to 
cover the necessities of life from income tax and imposing a flat rate of 
tax upon the rest. But the objection does not depend on a poor person’s 
ability to afford adequate food or shelter. The ability to go away on a 
relaxing vacation might make a real difference in the life of a taxpayer 
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just above the tax exemption threshold. Alternatively, proportionate 
taxation might alternatively be defended in terms of the equal treatment 
of taxpayers. It seems quite plausible that every taxpayer should face the 
same tax rate at the given level of income. But why equal marginal tax 
rates at different levels of income should be required as a matter of 
treating citizens equally is rather mysterious. Perhaps the best defence of 
proportionate taxation is that it provides a simple, clear, and impartial 
rule for allocating tax burdens that diminishes the extent to which one 
group of citizens may unfairly shift the tax burden onto another. If 
proportionate taxation is not the best policy, at least it prevents worse. 
This is roughly the conclusion that Henry Sidgwick (1887) came to 
despite his acknowledgement that progressive rates of taxation could, in 
theory, have salutatory distributive effects. 
In any case, proponents of progressive taxation have had their way in 
most developed countries since the early twentieth century. They 
advance a range of arguments for progressive taxation. First, one might 
argue that progressive taxation is required by some egalitarian theory of 
distributive justice. A second argument is that because marginal utility 
of income diminishes with income, progressive marginal tax rates 
maximise aggregate welfare. In other words, a 1 per cent tax will 
diminish the welfare of a poor taxpayer more than the welfare of a 
wealthy taxpayer. For this reason, one might think that ability to pay in 
the normatively relevant sense increases more with income for the 
wealthy than for middle-income taxpayers. Third, progressive taxation 
serves as insurance against bad outcomes for citizens who are uncertain 
about their future prospects. It may be worthwhile to accept the prospect 
of higher taxes in the case of economic good fortune in exchange for 
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lower taxes in the case of ill-fortune. One need not be a utilitarian to see 
risk spreading as an important function of the social welfare state (Heath 
2006). A final consideration is that material inequality may diminish 
social solidarity and make it more difficult to devise policies that serve 
the needs of both rich and poor. Designing effective public policy is 
easier when most citizens have income levels near the mean, since they 
are likely to have similar interests to each other. By contrast, the very 
rich and very poor have little in common with each other or with the 
middle class. Furthermore, inequality may tend to undercut loyalty to 
the nation or willingness to sacrifice for it if people perceive that the 
benefits from collective efforts accrue to only a few at the very top of 
society. And greatly unequal societies may find it difficult to prevent the 
ultra-wealthy from corrupting the political process or undermining 
democratic control of government altogether. 
Opponents of progressive taxation, such as Mill and Sidgwick, worry 
that allowing higher rates for a small minority of taxpayers will 
encourage confiscatory tax rates or wasteful spending since only the 
very wealthy will bear this burden. Once progressivity is introduced to 
the tax code, it is difficult to find a principled limit. One might suspect, 
therefore, that there is a tendency for tax rates to rise to dysfunctional, 
confiscatory levels. Lower- and middle-income voters might readily 
vote for higher taxes on the wealthy without much regard for whether 
the revenue is well spent. Subsequent history should provide some 
reassurance on this point. Although marginal tax rates on the wealthy 
reached extremely high levels in the US and various western European 
counties during the mid-twentieth century, these rates have fallen very 
substantially since then. At the same time, the tax burden on middle- and 
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lower-income citizens in many counties has increased substantially. It 
does not appear, therefore, that progressive taxation inevitably creates a 
one-way ratchet effect in countries with universal suffrage (Scheve & 
Stasavage 2016). 
Opponents of progressive taxation also worry that excessively high tax 
rates discourage work by highly skilled workers, savings and investment 
by the affluent, or both. High marginal tax rates also encourage higher 
earners to devote their energies to tax avoidance rather than to socially 
productive activity. There is a vast economics literature on the incentive 
effects of high taxes on the rich. Many studies suggest that top tax rates 
in most developed countries are not enough to be seriously deleterious 
(Diamond & Saez 2010). This is not, however, a universal view and 
there is heated disagreement among experts (Feldstein 1995). As will be 
discussed presently, there are ways to mitigate the incentive effects of 
progressive taxation, although these strategies may also have 
undesirable distributive consequences. 
II.B ‘Benefits’ theories of tax fairness 
‘Benefits’ theories of tax fairness are a rival to both proportionate and 
progressive ability to pay theories. Benefits theories evaluate the 
fairness of tax burdens in light of benefits received from the state. The 
underlying idea is that of reciprocity: a tax is fair if benefits received 
from the state at least roughly compensate for the burdens of taxation. If 
one assumes, as Adam Smith (1776) did, that benefits received by the 
state vary in proportion to income, the normative upshot of the benefits 
theory might not differ greatly from ability-to-pay approaches. There is 
no reason, however, to believe that this is always the case. In any case, 
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the normative foundations of the two approaches are very different. An 
important objection to benefits theories is that it is extremely difficult to 
value the benefit that each person receives from public goods such as 
national defence, a well-functioning legal system, environmental 
protection, or a high-quality system of education (Mill 1848). What is 
needed is some way to measure the benefits received by individual 
taxpayers. One strategy is to require unanimous consent for the 
imposition of new taxes (Wicksell 1958). Since taxpayers will not 
consent to a tax that does not produce sufficient benefits to leave them 
better off, all taxes under such a scheme should benefit every taxpayer. 
The unanimity rule thus forces taxpayers to reveal their private valuation 
of public spending. Furthermore, citizens that value a prospective 
spending project especially highly should be willing to assume the costs 
even if other citizens decline to raise their own taxes. In practice, of 
course, the problems of opportunistic holdouts and of irrationality make 
it prudent to relax the unanimity requirement to a large supermajority 
(Buchanan 1975). In principle, constitutional mechanisms could be 
designed to approximate a scheme of taxation based on the relative 
benefits enjoyed by different taxpayers. Such a system might turn out to 
have troubling distributive consequences, but its possibility shows that 
benefits theory proponents have more resources at their disposal than 
was recognised in Mill’s time. 
A second way to determine how different taxpayers value various 
government services is ‘Tieboutian’ competition, which involves 
citizens sorting themselves into groups for purchasing local public 
goods (Tiebout 1956). Decentralising some aspects of fiscal policy so 
that local governments can pursue different policies gives prospective 
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residents a choice between different packages of taxes and government 
services offered in different jurisdictions. For example, parks and 
libraries might be funded out of local property taxes. Some citizens 
might select jurisdictions with higher taxes and more expensive services, 
while others might opt for the reverse, thus satisfying the mutually 
inconsistent preferences of both groups. The benefits of public goods are 
also more closely linked to the burdens of taxation since the value of 
high-quality public services tends to be capitalised into real estate 
prices. However, Tieboutian competition relies on a relatively high 
geographical mobility combined with fiscal decentralisation and so may 
have somewhat limited application outside of countries with a suitable 
tradition of local government. Local residents may be best positioned to 
monitor the quality of local public goods, but this matters only if 
political authorities are sensitive to local sentiments. Tieboutian 
competition also threatens to exacerbate inequalities if wealthier citizens 
are able to cluster together to purchase local public goods while 
withdrawing support for public goods at the national level. 
A third strategy is to rely on special purpose taxes that raise funds for 
particular purposes from those who benefit. For example, funding road 
repairs from petrol taxes and tolls has the effect of collecting revenue 
from people in very rough proportion to the extent to which they benefit 
from their use. Creating an explicit link between taxation and spending 
that benefits the taxpayer may be useful in building political support. 
This seems to be the case for state pension and social insurance 
programs. Although there is no principled reason why they should not be 
funded out of general tax revenue, it is often the case that pension and 
disability insurance programs are supported by special payroll taxes, as 
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in the US, the UK, France, Germany, and many other nations. Workers 
may be more likely to accept this tax as fair because social insurance 
payments during retirement are conditioned on prior tax contributions. 
This advantage must be weighed against the inefficiency of maintaining 
separate systems of payroll and income taxation. 
Benefits theories have traditionally been associated with classical 
liberalism since they seem to provide a principled way to limit the 
potential obligations of taxpayers, especially wealthier ones. As a 
historical matter, however, benefits theories were often used to argue in 
favour of more rather than less progressive taxation. Until at least the 
nineteenth century, income and property taxation was not the primary 
source of government revenue. Tariff revenue and various consumption 
taxes likely were regressive compared to proportionate income taxation 
since the wealthy, who need not consume all of their income, would bear 
a relatively small proportion of the tax. Adam Smith’s appeal for 
proportionate income taxation likely would have represented an increase 
in the progressivity of the tax system of his time. Likewise, Knut 
Wicksell (1958) saw his unanimity rule as a way to prevent the wealthy 
and powerful from shifting the tax burden to the poor and powerless. 
Whether the benefits principle is inconsistent with progressive 
taxation depends on how one measures benefits. If benefits are measured 
in terms of cost to the state, the benefits theories will tend to suggest 
that taxes on the wealthy must be rather modest. But if benefits are 
measured, as contemplated by Wicksell, in terms of willingness to pay, 
the benefits received by wealthy taxpayers might be quite sizable since 
willingness to pay tends to increase with income for most good and 
services. This interpretation of the benefits principle provides a rule that 
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limits oppressive taxation while being neutral between tax policies that 
benefit all taxpayers. A progressive interpretation of the benefits 
principle would suggest that wealthier taxpayers should pay higher tax 
rates because they derive the greatest benefit from the existing political 
order. Low-wage workers derive less benefit from the persistence of the 
present government because they have little property to protect and 
could continue to earn subsistence wages under a different political 
regime. The principle that taxpayers should not be forced to pay more in 
taxes than the benefits they receive in return therefore seems consistent 
with funding national defence, the legal system, and other public goods 
that protect property rights entirely out of taxes on the better off. 
II.C Egalitarianism and utilitarianism 
In contrast to the tax-specific principles of fairness considered thus 
far, one might instead analyse tax policy in light of some egalitarian 
theory of distributive justice, such as Rawls’s difference principle. Such 
principles of distributive justice are used to evaluate government policy 
as a whole rather than applying to tax policy in isolation. Taxes are 
simply a tool, albeit a very important tool, to be used alongside transfer 
payments and other government spending programs to achieve just 
distributive results. Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel (2002) argue that 
since just post-tax distributions are all that matters, taxes should not be 
evaluated by comparison with pre-tax income or with the benefits 
received from public spending. Tax-specific principles of fairness that 
take the existing distribution of property rights and pre-tax income as a 
normative baseline are confused because the normative status of 
property rights depends on the resulting distribution of post-tax income 
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and thus cannot provide any independent basis for evaluating the 
fairness of tax burdens. In other words, the property entitlements that 
produce taxable income are just only insofar as the entire system of 
property rights, tax obligations, transfer payments, and government 
spending is just. Measuring ability to pay in light of an unjust 
distribution of property rights will not yield a fair scheme of taxation. 
Nor will evaluating taxes in relation to the benefits of an unjust fiscal 
system. 
Much of the reception of Murphy and Nagel’s argument focused on 
the question of whether people have any pre-institutional claim to 
income from property or labour. If they do, then Murphy and Nagel’s 
attack on principles of tax fairness that compare tax obligations to pre-
tax income fails. Both this debate and the debate over the correct 
principles of distributive justice are far beyond the scope of what can be 
considered in this chapter. In any case, there are reasons to be sceptical 
of Murphy and Nagel’s approach even if one sets aside objections 
grounded in natural rights. Although one might reasonably argue that 
people with special talents, wealthy parents, or good luck do not 
intrinsically deserve higher incomes than others, it does not follow that 
the state should be free to redistribute revenue from such assets as it sees 
fit. Whatever the theoretical virtues of Nagel and Murphy’s approach, it 
has the disadvantage of seeming to reduce questions of tax policy to the 
most controversial questions of distributive justice. If the fairness of tax 
rules depends largely on broad questions about the fairness of the 
existing distribution of property rights, it is hard to see how one can 
achieve agreement between members of the public with differing 
ideological commitments. In a polity with deep disagreements about 
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distributive justice, taxing power unconstrained by pre-institutional 
entitlements may seem less attractive. In the interest of minimising 
negative-sum political conflict, it may be reasonable to treat existing 
property entitlements as having some normative weight and patterns of 
pre-tax income as providing some constraints on the permissible degree 
of redistribution (Lindsay 2016). Ability to pay and benefits theories of 
taxation have the virtue of approaching questions of tax fairness in a 
way that may allow people with different views on broader distributive 
questions to find common ground. 
Utilitarians may agree with Nagel and Murphy that there are no tax-
specific principles of justice and argue that just tax policies are those 
that maximise aggregate utility (Kaplow 2008). In general, a utilitarian 
approach to tax policy will be concerned both to allocate the tax burden 
to those able to pay with the least loss in welfare and to impose taxes in 
a manner that distorts the behaviour of taxpayers as little as possible. 
However, these considerations are often at cross-purposes. Taxes that 
minimise economic distortions, such as lump-sum taxes that collect a 
fixed sum from every taxpayer regardless of income, tend to be 
regressive. Taxes that minimise the welfare loss of the taxpayer, 
however, tend to be progressive to the extent that the marginal utility of 
income declines as taxpayers become richer (Edgeworth 1897). 
Utilitarians more concerned with the first consideration will tend to 
favour relatively less progressive tax policies, while those concerned 
with the second consideration will tend to favour relatively more 
progressive tax policies. Agreement on ethical principles does not, 
therefore, assure agreement on tax policy, especially for those, such as 
utilitarians, who are committed to highly abstract ethical principles. 
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Utilitarian analysis of taxation sometimes reaches conclusions that 
seem peculiar from the perspective of competing theories and fly in the 
face of popular sentiment. On plausible assumptions about the effect of 
tax rates on work, marginal tax rates should decline over a certain level 
of income (Mirrlees 1971). The reason for this is that taxpayers with 
high earning capacity may be tempted to use their high income to cut 
back on labour effort and are especially likely to do so if facing a high 
marginal tax rate. This policy has the counter-intuitive result that 
extremely high earners actually pay lower marginal tax rates on their last 
dollar of income than those with much lower incomes. Similarly, it 
might be better to avoid direct taxes on labour entirely and instead tax 
some fixed attribute that is a proxy for capacity to earn so as to avoid 
disincentives for earning income. 
Consumption taxation provides another illustration of the tension 
between economic efficiency and distributive concerns. As Frank 
Ramsey (1927) argued, consumption taxes are more efficient when 
applied to items for which demand is relatively inelastic – in other 
words for which consumers are unlikely to change their behaviour in 
response to higher taxes. This has the implication that sales tax rates 
should be set differently on different items, potentially with higher taxes 
on staples that are relatively price-insensitive. 
That utilitarian reasoning sometimes yields results at odds with 
common intuitions about tax fairness should not be surprising. Hardline 
utilitarians will not find it disconcerting. Yet there is reason for 
utilitarians as well as for egalitarians such as Nagel and Murphy to be 
attentive to popular sentiments when designing tax policy. If, as was 
argued earlier, public perceptions of tax fairness are important in 
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securing voluntary compliance with the tax system as well as political 
support, divergence between philosophical theories and “folk theories” 
of tax fairness may diminish cooperation with the tax authorities even if 
one believes that the folk are mistaken. 
III. What to tax 
Establishing principles for the allocation of tax burdens among 
taxpayers is only one task faced by policy-makers. Two other questions 
are perhaps even more fundamental: the question of what is to be taxed 
and the question of how to individuate taxpayers. The first of these 
questions concerns the nature of the tax base. Candidates include 
income, consumption, property, socially undesirable activities (e.g., 
pollution, smoking, drinking), and foreign trade. The choice of a tax 
base is of fundamental importance because it shapes the options 
available to every citizen. In addition, governments often exempt certain 
goods from taxation, which has the effect of making decisions about 
what constitutes taxable economic activity an important expression of 
public values and a significant component of social welfare policy. 
Caution must be exercised when approaching this issue because the 
person who pays a tax does not necessarily bear its economic cost. It is 
sometimes very different to determine tax incidence. For example, the 
incidence of sales tax depends on the responses of sellers and buyers to 
the imposition of the tax. Depending on these responses, the burden of 
the tax might fall predominantly on either party. 
One long-running debate concerns the relative merits of income and 
consumption taxes. The main difference is that an income tax applies to 
income regardless of whether it is saved or consumed, whereas a 
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consumption tax applies only to what is consumed. Thus, in a 
consumption tax system, a person who saves her income may postpone 
her tax liability until she chooses to consume her savings. One common 
argument for consumption taxes is that it is unfair to tax a person once 
when he earns income and then a second time on income from what he 
saves when a person who chooses to spend all of his earnings 
immediately is taxed only once (Mill 1848). Taxation of income likewise 
seems a socially undesirable disincentive to save and invest. Many 
experts favour a consumption tax on these grounds. Like income taxes, 
consumption taxes may be made progressive by imposing higher rates of 
taxation on those who spend more. Alternatively, a flat consumption tax, 
such as a value added tax, might be combined with an income tax that 
applies only to those with high incomes. The logic of this position is 
quite strong with respect to taxpayers with modest incomes and, in fact, 
many income tax systems provide ways to shield some amount of 
savings from taxation – for example, through pension plans or 
retirement accounts. On the other hand, a pure consumption tax system 
may allow great stocks of wealth to escape taxation altogether since 
taxation can be postponed indefinitely. This seems quite inequitable in 
the case of inherited wealth. In theory a vigorous inheritance tax regime 
should prevent wealthy heirs from escaping taxation, but in practice it is 
difficult for estate taxes to encompass all intergenerational wealth 
transmissions. A poorly designed inheritance tax system may serve as a 
trap for the unwary while allowing those with the benefit of the best 
advisors to avoid much of the tax. For these reasons, a progressive 
income or wealth tax may provide a useful backstop even in tax systems 
built primarily around consumption taxes. 
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An even more extreme proposal motivated by efficiency 
considerations is the so-called endowment tax, which taxes capacity to 
earn rather than actual income. By taxing people based on their potential 
earnings rather than the actual earnings, one could avoid the deleterious 
effect of discouraging highly compensated work and encouraging 
leisure. Income taxes are also arguably unfair to high earners who prefer 
consuming material goods to consuming leisure since those who prefer 
leisure enjoy their preferred good tax-free. Earning ability is not directly 
observable, so one would need to tax some proxy for it. Despite the 
economic case for such an approach, it is often felt that endowment 
taxes would be oppressive because they could force people to work at 
their highest paid occupation on pain of accepting a very low standard of 
living. For example, a talented investor who owes taxes based on the 
highest wage that she could receive in the market might have such a 
high tax liability that she could not afford not to work in finance. 
Opponents of endowment taxation bear the burden of explaining why 
this effect is less objectionable than income taxation compelling 
taxpayers to work longer to achieve a given post-tax income (Olson 
2010). 
An alternative to general taxes on income, earning ability, 
consumption, or wealth is to levy taxes on socially undesirable 
activities. So-called Pigouvian taxes seek to discourage externalities, 
such as pollution, by imposing a tax that is equal to the social harm 
caused by the externality. For example, one might impose a tax on 
carbon emissions designed to reflect the social harm of their 
contribution to global climate change. This has the fortuitous 
consequence of raising revenue by discouraging something socially 
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undesirable, such as pollution, rather than something socially desirable, 
such as working or investing. Extensive use of Pigouvian taxes, 
however, risks imposing inequitable tax burdens since tax incidence will 
depend on factors only loosely related to ability to pay or the benefits 
received from public spending. It is better, therefore, to regard 
Pigouvian taxes as being primarily justified as a form of regulation 
rather than as a way to raise revenue. 
IV. How to define the taxpayer 
In order to apportion tax burdens between taxpayers, one must first 
decide who counts as a taxpayer. Taxes may be assessed at the level of 
households or individuals. For example, some countries encourage 
spouses to file joint tax returns, whereas others tax each adult as an 
individual regardless of his or her marital status. Under a system of 
progressive taxation, these choices can have quite significant 
implications because married people with different incomes will face 
different tax rates depending on whether they are taxed individually or 
jointly. If, as in the US, a couple is taxed jointly under progressive tax 
rates, lower-earning spouses may face a much higher marginal income 
tax rate than they would as single persons. This is a substantial incentive 
for those with a high-earning spouse to drop out of the labour force. By 
contrast, there is no such incentive where, as in the UK, each adult is 
taxed separately. However, under the UK system, two households with 
the same income may owe very different amounts of income tax and 
single-income households may face a high marginal tax rates at a 
relatively modest household income. The US approach has the virtue of 
respecting horizontal equity between households and might be more 
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supportive of middle-income families with children. The UK system 
avoids providing an incentive for second earners to drop out of the 
labour force or cut back on hours worked. Under progressive tax rates 
the trade-off between equal tax obligations for households with equal 
incomes and equal marginal tax rates for workers with equal incomes is 
unavoidable: one cannot have both at the same time. 
The tax treatment of households with children likewise raises thorny 
questions. Income tax systems differ greatly in their treatment of 
children. Some countries, such as France, tax families in proportion to 
the number of members, thus substantially lowering the effective tax 
rate for families with children, especially for those with many children 
(Loutzenhiser 2016). At the other extreme, the UK does not consider 
family structure at all in taxation of income from labour and instead 
offers a “child benefit” outside of the tax code that is phased out at 
higher levels of income (Loutzenhiser 2016). Tax benefits for lower-
income families with children might be justified as an anti-poverty 
measure. Tax policy regarding middle-class families with children 
depends crucially on whether it is fair for the state (and implicitly 
childless taxpayers) to defray the costs of raising children or whether 
costs should fall on parents. If the decision to have children is treated 
like a private consumption decision and does not trigger tax benefits, 
then child-rearing expenses will consume a large portion of the post-tax 
income of middle-income households with children. If, on the other 
hand, households with children are given extra tax exemptions, parents 
will owe substantially lower taxes than non-parents with equivalent 
income. This question is less urgent in societies where the majority of 
taxpayers will fall in each category over the course of their lifetimes. In 
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places where a large fraction of taxpayers never have children, the 
stakes are much higher. 
A final question is how to tax business enterprises. Most countries 
impose income taxes on large corporations directly. In part this is done 
for administrative convenience since it may be easier to collect taxes 
from one corporate entity than from its thousands of investors. To the 
extent that corporate taxes are not counted against the tax liability of 
investors, the justification for taxing corporations is unclear. Economists 
are uncertain whether the burden of taxes on corporate income falls on 
investors, employees, or consumers (Shaviro 2009). The answer may be 
different in different contexts. If it is consumers or employees rather 
than investors who ultimately pay, corporate taxes do not necessarily 
contribute much to the progressivity of an income tax system. The only 
clear justification for corporate taxation is that it prevents wealthy 
individuals from using corporate entities to shelter their income from 
tax. 
In any case, increasing international capital mobility and the growth of 
cross-border transactions are undermining the ability of national 
governments to tax multinational corporations and capital income more 
generally (Kleinbard 2011). Multinational corporations increasingly 
organise transactions so as to realise income in low-tax jurisdictions 
even when mainly doing business in higher-tax jurisdictions. In one 
notorious case, the US coffee chain Starbucks managed to operate a 
large, fast-growing, and apparently profitable chain of coffee shops in 
the UK while recognising virtually no income for tax purposes in the 
UK by, for example, making payments to a Dutch subsidiary for use of 
Starbucks’s “intellectual property”, including its brand and its business 
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plan (Kleinbard 2013). Shifting income to low-tax jurisdictions is even 
easier for multinationals that are genuinely dependent on ownership of 
intellectual property, such as Google or Apple (Kleinbard 2011). This 
tax avoidance behaviour is often openly abetted by countries that seek to 
attract investment by offering the promise of little taxation and no 
transparency to foreign tax authorities. Tax treaties have traditionally 
aimed to alleviate double taxation of income in which the same revenue 
is taxed concurrently in two jurisdictions. Today, the OECD and the G20 
are grappling with how to avoid double non-taxation of income through 
the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project. International 
cooperation on this front will require agreement on how to allocate 
income between jurisdictions. In light of these developments, tax theory 
cannot focus exclusively on the nation-state, but must consider the 
international dimensions of distributive questions. What is good policy 
from the perspective of citizens of one state may have adverse effects on 
foreign nationals. 
Tax competition between nations is part of the reason for the recent 
trend away from reliance on taxation of capital and towards higher 
payroll and consumption taxes. Whatever the policy merits of this trend 
(itself a hotly contested question), one might worry that democratic 
governments, especially in smaller economies, have less policy 
flexibility and are therefore less responsive to the views of their own 
citizens. In this case, democratic control might require international 
agreements that carve out a space for tax policy on the national level 
that is protected from tax competition. 
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V. Taxation and democracy 
The relationship between tax fairness and democracy is complex. 
Benefits theories of tax fairness might be thought to be in tension with 
democratic considerations because they tend to represent taxation as an 
exchange with the state and taxpayers as consumers of government 
services rather than regarding the taxpayer as one of many citizens who 
govern collectively (Mill 1848). Ability-to-pay theories, by contrast, 
regard taxation as a collective obligation shared by citizens. Mill’s equal 
sacrifice principle establishes a link between tax fairness and the 
obligation of a state to treat citizens as equals that seems especially apt 
for democracies. This leaves much scope for disagreement about what 
equality requires. It may be argued that equality requires that tax policy 
mitigate economic inequalities between taxpayers or that equality 
requires only that that all make reasonable contributions to public goods 
in light of their means. Alternatively, Elizabeth Anderson’s (1999) 
theory of democratic equality suggests that our focus should be on 
policies that allow all citizens to be able to relate to each other as equals. 
This might counsel in favour of income and inheritance taxes to 
dissipate fortunes that threaten to undermine social equality but allow 
for some degree of economic inequality so long as higher- and lower-
income citizens are able to interact as equals. Anderson’s theory might 
also imply that tax and transfer policies should be arranged such that 
low-income citizens pay at least a nominal amount of tax so that all 
citizens are seen as contributors to the public fisc. 
Although ability-to-pay theories may appear more democratic in spirit, 
setting taxes according to benefits received may have advantages for 
polities deeply divided on questions of fiscal policy. Doing so allows 
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governments to simultaneously satisfy the preferences of citizens who 
prefer high taxes and lavish public services and those of citizens who 
prefer low taxes and stingy public services. This might be accomplished 
by fiscal decentralisation that allows citizens to select jurisdictions that 
match their preferred levels of taxation and public spending or by 
funding services out of taxes that are targeted at users, such as fuel taxes 
that are earmarked to fund road repairs. Agreeing to disagree is one 
possible result of democratic deliberation. An alternative approach is to 
require universal consent to new taxation and government spending. 
This might both appeal to ideals of collective self-government and 
safeguard citizens against oppressive levels of taxation. 
The best policy-making will combine rigorous thinking about the 
ethical aims of tax policy with nuanced understanding of the economic 
effects of tax policy and the psychology of tax compliance. It is not 
necessary, or perhaps even desirable, that all taxes be justified in the 
same way. A single fiscal system might combine forms of taxation 
justified on different grounds. For example, public goods that are 
inherently national in scope might be funded by income or consumption 
taxes assessed in light of ability to pay and adjusted to pursue 
distributive aims at the national level. Other taxes might follow the logic 
of the benefits principle or be derived from Pigouvian taxes. 
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